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THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION AND 
COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE ON INVESTOR JUDGMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Regulators have increased the disclosure requirements of top executives as part of 
corporate governance reform. This study examines how trust arising from a firm’s corporate 
reputation will interact with top executive compensation disclosure to influence investor 
judgments. This study used a 2 X 2 between subjects experimental design, with corporate 
reputation (good versus bad) and pay ratio (high versus low) as independent variables to test the 
hypotheses. The key findings show that if the firm with a good corporate reputation discloses a 
high pay ratio, participants punished the good reputation firm more than the bad reputation firm, 
demonstrating a negative violation of expectations. On the other hand, if the firm with a bad 
corporate reputation discloses a low pay ratio, participants rewarded the bad reputation firm more 
than the good reputation firm, demonstrating a positive violation of expectations. The results of 
this study may be limited by its particular circumstances of corporate reputation and compensation 
disclosure, making generalizations of the findings to other settings difficult. 
 
Keywords: corporate reputation, executive compensation disclosure, investor judgments 
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1. Introduction 
A key aspect of compensation disclosure relates to top executive compensation. Regulators 
have increased the disclosure requirements of top executives as part of corporate governance 
reform. In 2015, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a final rule that 
requires a public company to disclose the ratio of the compensation of its chief executive officer 
(CEO) to the median compensation of its employees with effect from January 2017 (SEC 2015). 
As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the rule require companies to disclose the median of the 
annual total compensation of all its employees, except the CEO; the annual total compensation of 
its CEO; and the ratio of those two amounts (SEC 2015). In U.K., the government passed The 
Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, which requires additional disclosures on 
CEO pay ratios to be made in listed companies’ annual reports for financial years starting on or 
after January 1, 2019 (U.K. National Archive 2018). Affected firms will be required to publish the 
ratio of their CEO’s total remuneration to the median, 25th and 75th percentile total remuneration 
of their employees. 
Perceived excess top executive compensation has attracted much criticism from the public. 
The public viewed top executive compensation as out of control and an unfair allocation of 
resources (Hill 2016). U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May championed for “responsible capitalism” 
and cited “runaway executive pay as creating an irrational, unhealthy and growing gap between 
what these companies pay their workers and what they pay their bosses” (Parker 2016). Trust is 
an important component of social capital and has always played an important role in capital 
markets (Levitt, 1998; Williamson 1993). This study examines how trust arising from a firm’s 
corporate reputation will interact with executive compensation disclosure to influence investor 
judgments. 
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This study used a 2 X 2 between subjects experimental design, with corporate reputation 
(good versus bad) and pay ratio (high versus low) as independent variables to test the hypotheses. 
The findings show that investor judgements of a firm were more positive when the firm has a good 
corporate reputation than when it has a bad corporate reputation. Participants also react more 
positively to the disclosure of low than high pay ratio. This study also examined the joint effects 
of corporate reputation and pay ratio on investor judgments. The findings show that if the firm 
with a good corporate reputation discloses a high pay ratio, participants punished the good 
reputation firm more than the bad reputation firm. On the other hand, if the firm with a bad 
corporate reputation discloses a low pay ratio, participants rewarded the bad reputation firm more 
than the good reputation firm. 
There is evidence of substantial differences in the readability of disclosures related to top 
executive pay made by firms. Thus, a supplementary experiment was conducted to examine the 
generalizability of the main experiment’s results to a situation where the readability of pay ratio 
disclosure is lower. The results show that the effects of pay ratio disclosure is diminished when 
readability is lower (as is the case in the supplementary condition) than when it is higher (as is the 
case in the main experiment). 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate reputation. Prior studies have generally 
documented positive effects associated with corporate reputation. Herremans et al. (1993) find that 
good corporate social responsibility reputation leads to better economic performance. Hirst et al. 
(1999) also document positive effects of management credibility on investor judgments in 
evaluating earnings forecasts. While Ciani and Kaplan (2010) similarly document how CEO 
reputation can positively influence investor judgment about a firm’s future performance, they also 
note that trust arising from reputational effects are malleable and sensitive to context. We extend 
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the literature by highlighting how trust arising from corporate reputation can interact with 
compensation disclosure to influence investor judgments. Our disclosure setting is especially 
pertinent given that top executive compensation has been an area of contention in recent years and 
could potentially undermine trust more easily than other forms of disclosure (Hoskisson et al. 
2009). Hill (2016) argued that “excessive pay is the biggest obstacle to restoration of trust in 
business.” 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. The subsequent sections describe the research method and 
present the results. The final section discusses the implications, limitations and opportunities for 
future research. 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Corporate reputation 
Barnett et al. (2006) define corporate reputation as “observers’ collective judgment of a 
corporation based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to 
the corporation over time”. One stream of research focuses on how corporate reputation influences 
stakeholder trust, which relates to their perceptions of the reliability, honesty, and benevolence of 
companies, and how it can influence their judgments. In general, research in this area finds that 
people inherently trust good reputation firms more than bad reputation firms (Berens and Van 
Riels 2004). 
It is possible that when investors trust a firm more, they will rely more heavily on the 
disclosures that it makes. Consistent with this, Pevzner et al. (2015) find that investor reactions to 
earnings news is stronger in more trusting than less trusting countries because such news is 
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perceived to be more credible. To the extent that this applies to our setting, it is likely that investors 
will trust the disclosures of a good reputation firm more than a bad reputation firm and 
consequently put more weight on the disclosures of the good reputation firm than that of the bad 
reputation firm. 
A sense of trust towards a firm can function as a cue in making heuristic judgments which 
people use to cope with complexity and to reduce cognitive effort across a wide range of decision 
making tasks (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Research in the accounting literature provides 
evidence that the trust heuristic is used in various contexts, including when audit supervisors 
review their subordinates’ work (Kadous et al. 2013; Tan and Jamal 2001) and when investors 
make investment judgments following the announcement of restatements (Elliott et al. 2012). 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that investors would judge the firm more positively when 
the firm has a good corporate reputation than when it has a bad corporate reputation. 
H1: Investor judgements of a firm will be more positive when the firm has a good 
corporate reputation than when it has a bad corporate reputation. 
2.2 Pay ratio 
Equity theory compares the ratio of contributions and benefits for each employee and 
advocates a fair balance to be struck (Adams 1963). Employees judge the overall "fairness" of a 
relationship by comparing their contributions and benefits with an internally derived standard. 
They value fair treatment, which causes them to be motivated to keep the fairness maintained 
within the firm. Perceived unfair treatment would result in negative outcomes. 
Prior studies have shown that perceptions of the “fairness” of top executive compensation 
affects the company’s investment potential (Gopalan 2007; Kelly and Seow 2016). Gopalan (2007) 
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argued that shame sanctions would curb excessive CEO compensation. Investors perceived the 
company’s investment potential negatively if their perception of the CEO compensation was 
excessive and unfair. Kelly and Seow (2016) found that a higher-than-industry pay ratio between 
a CEO's pay and median employee pay prompted participants in an experiment to deem a CEO's 
pay unfair, resulting in negative effects on their perceptions about the company. Due to the 
negative perceptions of unfairness, participants were less likely to invest in the company. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that investors would judge the firm more positively when 
the firm discloses a low pay ratio than when it discloses a high pay ratio. 
H2: The improvement (deterioration) in investor judgements of a firm will be larger 
(smaller) after it discloses a low pay ratio than a high pay ratio. 
2.3 Joint effects of corporate reputation and pay ratio 
The expectancy violations theory in the communication literature assumes that people form 
expectations based on the communications that they receive (Burgoon and Burgoon 2001). People 
expect their predictions to come true, based on the beliefs that they have formed. When the 
predictions do not come true, an expectancy violation has occurred. The theory predicts that 
negative violation would result in undesirable results, while positive violation can produce 
desirable results. 
Prior studies based on expectancy violations theory suggest that expectations can affect 
how users interpret a firm’s accounting choices and judge the investment potential (Clor-Proell 
2009; Fleming 2009). Clor-Proell (2009) found that users’ investment decisions are more extreme 
when a mismatch occurs between actual and expected accounting choices than when a match 
occurs. Participants invested significantly more or less when they receive a mismatch than when 
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they receive a match. Fleming (2009) found that negative violations adversely affect investment-
screening judgments. Venture capitalists will view new ventures as less favourable when proposals 
violate their expectations about the precision of the forecast estimates. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a firm with a good corporate reputation is expected to 
disclose a low pay ratio than a firm with a bad corporate reputation. Thus, if a firm with a good 
corporate reputation discloses a high pay ratio, there is a negative violation of expectations and the 
good reputation firm would be punished more harshly than a bad reputation firm by investors. On 
the other hand, a firm with a bad corporate reputation is expected to disclose a high pay ratio than 
a firm with a good corporate reputation. Thus, if a firm with a bad corporate reputation discloses 
a low pay ratio, there is a positive violation of expectations and the bad reputation firm would be 
rewarded more than a good reputation firm. 
H3: After a firm discloses a high pay ratio, the improvement (deterioration) in investor 
judgments will be larger (smaller) if the firm has a bad corporate reputation than if it 
has a good corporate reputation. 
H4: After a firm discloses a low pay ratio, the improvement (deterioration) in investor 
judgments will be larger (smaller) if the firm has a bad corporate reputation than if it 
has a good corporate reputation. 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Participants 
We conducted our experiment with 244 participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) platform.1 This pool of participants represents suitable proxies for non-professional 
                                                            
1 Prior approval for the experiment was obtained from our university’s Institutional Review Board. 
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investors. In particular, AMT has been used in prior accounting studies (e.g. Koonce et al. 2015; 
Rennekamp 2012), and has been demonstrated to replicate results obtained in existing accounting 
studies (Krische 2015). The extent literature shows that participants recruited on the AMT platform 
often exert just as much effort as other student participants commonly used in such studies 
(Paolacci et al. 2010). As such, recruiting from the AMT platform allows us to use participants 
who possess sufficient knowledge to perform the experiment but at the same time do not represent 
subjects who are more sophisticated than necessary (Libby et al. 2002). Consistent with this, 
Blankespoor et al. (2017), who use AMT participants in their study, find that participants’ 
perceptions correlate highly with market valuations of their focal firm while Farrell et al. (2017) 
find that AMT participants exert equal or more effort than other participant populations in 
completing accounting-research related tasks as proxies for non-professional investors. 
Hauser and Schwarz (2016) suggest that including attention check questions in 
experimental studies using AMT subjects are an effective way to determine if participants pay 
sufficient attention when completing experiments. Accordingly, we included two attention check 
questions in our experiment. Overall, 100.0% of participants answered at least one attention check 
question correctly and 82.0% of participants answered both attention check question correctly. 
3.2 Design and procedure 
We used a 2 X 2 between subjects design for our experiment, with corporate reputation 
(good versus bad) and pay ratio (high versus low) as independent variables to test our hypotheses. 
In the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of four online experimental 
conditions. In all conditions, participants were told to assume the role of a potential investor of 
Great Meals Corporation, a fictitious US-based restaurant operator. They were also provided with 
background information, including the most recent quarterly financial results, about the company. 
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Next, to operationalize the corporate reputation manipulation, participants were told that 
the Reputation Institute (RI), an independent organization, conducts an annual study to measure 
the corporate reputation of the world’s largest firms. As part of its methodology, RI measures a 
company’s ability to deliver on stakeholders’ expectations across the following seven key 
dimensions of corporate reputation: (i) product and services, (ii) innovation, (iii) workplace, (iv) 
governance, (v) citizenship, (vi) leadership, and (vii) performance. Participants were told that RI 
rates companies across these seven dimensions and places each company in one of the following 
five corporate reputation categories: (i) excellent, (ii) strong, (iii) average, (iv) weak, and (v) poor.2 
Following this, participants were told that Great Meals had been included in RI’s 2017 study, and 
participants assigned to the good corporate reputation conditions were told that Great Meals had 
achieved an “excellent” corporate reputation rating while participants assigned to the bad corporate 
reputation conditions were told that Great Meals had achieved a “poor” corporate reputation rating. 
After viewing this information, all participants made their initial investment judgments about Great 
Meals.3 
To operationalize our pay ratio manipulation, we then told all participants that Great Meals 
had also recently disclosed information about the compensation of its employees in its proxy 
statement. Next, participants were provided with an extract from Great Meals’ proxy statement 
discussing its CEO’s pay ratio. All participants were told that the mean CEO-to-median employee 
pay ratio of a group of seventeen publicly-listed companies in the restaurant industry that Great 
Meals competes with for executive talent was 55 to 1. Further, participants assigned to the high 
                                                            
2 The methodology for measuring corporate reputation is adapted from the methodology applied by the Reputation Institute (2017) 
in developing the 2017 Global RepTrak 100, a ranking of the 100 most reputable companies globally in 2017. 
3 In providing their initial and final investment judgments, participants responded to the question “To what extent do you agree that 
Great Meals is a good investment?” on a 15 point scale, with -7 corresponding to “Strongly Disagree” and +7 corresponding to 
“Strongly Agree.” 
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pay ratio condition were provided with a version of the extract which stated that the CEO-to-
median employee pay ratio for Great Meals was 428 to 1 while participants assigned to the low 
pay ratio condition were provided with a version of the extract which stated that the CEO-to-
median employee pay ratio for Great Meals was 57 to 1. There is evidence to suggest that the pay 
ratios that we use in our experiment and our provision to all participants of the mean CEO-to-
median employee pay ratio of a peer group are consistent with industry disclosure norms. For 
example, a recent report by ISS Corporate Services, a consultant in corporate governance, 
compensation, and sustainability issues, documents that the median pay ratio across 23 industries 
ranges from about 23 to 1 to 150 to 1 (Kimball, 2013) while another report by Willis Tower Watson 
(2018), a HR consultant, documents significant variability in the pay ratios reported by companies 
within industries (up to a maximum of 5,000 to 1). Further, another article published by Willis 
Tower Watson (2017) recommends that in making pay ratio disclosures, companies should 
contrast their disclosures with those of their peers and companies in other industries. 
After viewing the CEO-to-median employee pay ratio information, participants then made 
their final investment judgments about Great Meals. They also provided their responses to a range 
of other questions relating to the case (including attention and manipulation checks and 
demographic information). 
4. Results 
4.1 Manipulation checks 
Participants’ ratings of the extent to which they agreed that Great Meals enjoys a good 
corporate reputation was significantly higher in the good corporate reputation condition (mean = 
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4.21) than in the bad corporate reputation condition (mean = -0.63, t = 9.98, p<0.01).4 Hence, our 
manipulation of corporate reputation was successful. In addition, 58.6% (χ2 = 7.23, p<0.01) of 
participants correctly identified whether Great Meals’ CEO’s annual total compensation presented 
to them was much higher than other CEOs in the company’s comparison group (as is the case in 
the high pay ratio condition) or was about the same as other CEOs in the company’s comparison 
group (as is the case in the low pay ratio condition), at a rate that is greater than chance. Our 
manipulation of CEO pay ratio was successful. 
4.2 Effects of corporate reputation on investor judgments 
H1 predicts that investor judgements of a firm will be more positive when the firm has a 
good corporate reputation than when it has a bad corporate reputation. We use two dependent 
variables to test this hypothesis. The first dependent variable is participants’ initial investment 
judgments of Great Meals (pre_investment) which was made immediately after participants 
viewed the corporate reputation manipulation while the second dependent variable is participants’ 
final investment judgments of Great Meals (post_investment) which was made after participants 
viewed the pay ratio manipulation. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for pre_investment, panel B presents the 
conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and panel C presents simple main effects tests. As 
shown in panel B, the effect of corporate reputation on pre_investment is significant (F = 146.05, 
p<0.01). Panel C shows that the effect of good versus bad corporate reputation on pre_investment 
is significant both when pay ratio is both high (F = 63.48, p<0.01) and low (F = 84.33, P<0.01). In 
addition, mean participant ratings in the good corporate reputation/high pay ratio condition (mean 
                                                            
4 Participants made their ratings on a fifteen point scale, with -7 corresponding to “Strongly Disagree” and +7 corresponding to 
“Strongly Agree.” Two-tailed tests are presented unless stated otherwise. 
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= 5.27) are higher than in the bad corporate reputation/high pay ratio condition (mean = 0.00,  
t = 7.97, p<0.01). Participant ratings are also higher in the good corporate reputation/low pay ratio 
condition (mean = 4.65) than in the bad corporate reputation/low pay ratio condition  
(mean = -0.98, t = 9.18, p<0.01). These results indicate that participants’ initial investment 
judgments are more positive when the firm has a good corporate reputation than when it has a bad 
corporate reputation. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for post_investment, panel B presents the 
conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and panel C presents simple main effects tests. As 
shown in panel B, the effect of corporate reputation on post_investment is significant (F = 93.37, 
p<0.01). Panel C shows that the effect of good versus bad corporate reputation on post_investment 
is significant both when pay ratio is both high (F = 32.18, p<0.01) and low (F = 69.70, P<0.01). In 
addition, participant ratings in the good corporate reputation/high pay ratio condition (mean = 
3.46) are higher than in the bad corporate reputation/high pay ratio condition (mean = -0.60,  
t = 5.67, p<0.01). Participant ratings are also higher in the good corporate reputation/low pay ratio 
condition (mean = 4.05) than in the bad corporate reputation/low pay ratio condition (mean = -
0.80, t = 8.35, p<0.01). These results indicate that participants’ final investment judgments, made 
after they have been provided with information related to pay ratio, continue to be more positive 
when the firm has a good corporate reputation than when it has a bad corporate reputation. Overall 
these findings provide support for H1, and are consistent with participants reacting more positively 
to a firm with a good than bad corporate reputation. 
Insert Table 2 here 
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4.3 Effects of pay ratio on investor judgments 
H2 predicts that the improvement (deterioration) in investor judgements of a firm will be 
larger (smaller) after it discloses a low pay ratio than a high pay ratio. We examine this hypothesis 
using the change in participants’ investment judgment (change_investment) as the dependent 
variable. Change_investment is computed by subtracting participants’ final investment judgments 
from their initial investment judgments (change_investment = post_investment – pre_investment). 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for change_investment, panel B presents 
the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and panel C presents simple main effects tests. 
The results in panel B indicate that the effect of pay ratio on change_investment is significant  
(F = 14.85, p<0.01). Further, when corporate reputation is good, the deterioration in 
change_investment in the low pay ratio condition (mean = -0.59) is smaller than in the high pay 
ratio condition (mean = -1.80, t = 3.34, p<0.01). When corporate reputation is bad, there is an 
improvement in participants’ investment judgments in the low pay ratio condition and a 
deterioration in their investment judgments in the high pay ratio condition. Change_investment is 
significantly larger in the bad corporate reputation/low pay ratio condition (mean = 0.18) than in 
the bad corporate reputation/high pay ratio condition (mean = -0.60, t = 2.14, p = 0.04). Overall, 
these support H2, and are consistent with participants reacting more positively/less negatively to 
the disclosure of low than high pay ratio. 
Insert Table 3 here 
4.4 Joint effects of corporate reputation and pay ratio on investor judgments 
H3 predicts that after a firm discloses a high pay ratio, the improvement (deterioration) in 
investor judgments will be larger (smaller) if the firm has a bad corporate reputation than if it has 
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a good corporate reputation. H4 predicts that after a firm discloses a low pay ratio, the 
improvement (deterioration) in investor judgments will be larger (smaller) if the firm has a bad 
corporate reputation than if it has a good corporate reputation. We examine these hypotheses using 
change_investment as the dependent variable. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the effects of both corporate reputation (F = 29.62, p<0.01) 
and pay ratio (F = 14.85, p<0.01) on change_investment are significant. Simple effects tests 
presented in Panel C of Table 3 also shows that the effects of good reputation versus bad reputation 
is significant both when pay ratio is high (F = 7.34, p = 0.01) and when it is low (F = 8.67, p<0.01). 
In the high pay ratio condition, the deterioration in participants’ investment judgments is 
larger in the good corporate reputation condition (mean = -1.80) than in the bad corporate 
reputation condition (mean = -0.60, t = 2.71, p = 0.01). This supports H3, and is consistent with a 
good reputation firm being punished more harshly than a bad reputation firm upon the disclosure 
of a high pay ratio. In the low pay ratio condition there is a deterioration in participants’ investment 
judgments in the good corporate reputation condition and an improvement in participants’ 
investment judgments in the bad corporate reputation condition. Change_investment is 
significantly larger in the bad corporate reputation/low pay ratio condition (mean = 0.18) than in 
the good corporate reputation/low pay ratio condition (mean = -0.60, t=2.14, p=0.02). This 
supports H4, and is consistent with a good reputation firm being punished and a bad reputation 
firm being rewarded upon the disclosure of a low pay ratio. 
4.5 Supplementary analysis 
Prior studies have suggested that managers can manipulate the readability of financial 
disclosure to strategically obfuscate bad news (e.g. Rennekamp 2012). Consistent with this, there 
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is evidence of substantial differences in the readability of disclosures related to CEO pay made by 
firms. For example, prior studies have found that the higher a CEO’s excessive pay, the less 
readable the related compensation disclosure becomes (Laksmana et al. 2012). At the outset, it is 
unclear if the readability of CEO pay ratio disclosure influences investor judgments. On one hand, 
prior studies suggest that the readability of disclosures can function as heuristic cues that influence 
investors’ processing of information and subsequently impact their judgments (e.g. Rennekamp 
2012). On the other hand, it is possible that investors view CEO pay ratio information as an 
important piece of information in making investment judgments and, as a result, process such 
information systematically, regardless of readability. 
Accordingly, we conduct a supplementary experiment to examine the generalizability of 
the results in our main experiment to a situation where the readability of CEO pay ratio disclosure 
is lower. In particular, we conduct a 2 X 2 between subjects experiment with corporate reputation 
(good versus bad) and pay ratio (high versus low) as independent variables. The supplementary 
experiment was conducted on 240 participants recruited from the AMT platform at the same time 
as the main experiment. All aspects of the supplementary experiment are identical to the main 
experiment other than for the lower readability of the CEO pay ratio disclosure presented to 
participants. We used the Bog index to measure readability in our study. The Bog index is a 
standard comprehensive measure of readability developed by Stylewriter software engineers based 
on plain English writing principles (Bonsall IV et al. 2017). Prior studies have examined the Bog 
index and concluded that it captures financial reporting readability attributes highlighted by the 
SEC (Bonsall IV et al. 2017). In the main experiment, the CEO pay ratio disclosure used had a 
Bog index of 64 in both the high and low pay ratio conditions. In the supplementary experiment, 
the CEO pay ratio disclosure used had a Bog index of 118 in both the high and low pay ratio 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311443 
 16 
 
conditions. A Bog index of 64 corresponds to a readability rating of “fair” while a Bog index of 
118 corresponds to a readability rating of “bad” on the Stylewriter software. 
4.6 Results of supplementary analysis 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 4 present the descriptive statistics, conventional analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), and simple main effects tests for pre_investment respectively. Panels A, B, 
and C of Table 5 present the equivalent results for post_investment. As shown in panel B of Tables 
4 and 5, the effect of corporate reputation is significant on both pre_investment (F = 78.57, p<0.00) 
and post_investment (F = 44.71, p<0.00). Panel C of Table 4 shows that the effect of good versus 
bad corporate reputation on pre_investment is significant when pay ratio is both high (F = 27.71, 
p<0.00) and low (F = 54.56, p<0.00). Similarly, panel C of Table 5 shows that the effect of good 
versus bad corporate reputation on post_investment is significant when pay ratio is both high  
(F = 13.73, p<0.00) and low (F = 35.54, p<0.00). We also find that pre_investment is significantly 
higher in the good (mean=4.86) than bad (mean=-0.53, t=8.85, p<0.01) corporate reputation 
condition and that post_investment is significantly higher in the good (mean=3.82) than bad 
(mean=-0.51, t=6.77, p<0.01) corporate reputation condition. Overall, these results indicate that 
participants in the supplementary experiment, as in the main experiment, continue to react more 
positively to firms with good than bad corporate reputation.  
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 6 present the descriptive statistics, conventional analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), and simple main effects tests for change_investment respectively. Panel B 
shows that the effect of pay ratio is significant on change_investment (F = 4.10, p=0.04). However, 
change_investment is not significantly different across the high (mean = -0.96) and low  
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(mean = -0.32) pay ratio condition (t = -0.91, p=0.14). In addition, change_investment is also no 
different across the good corporate reputation/high pay ratio (mean = -1.29) and good corporate 
reputation/low pay ratio (mean = -0.83, t = -1.40, p=0.17) conditions and across the bad corporate 
reputation/high pay ratio (mean = -0.24) and bad corporate reputation/low pay ratio (mean = -0.25, 
t = -1.47, p=0.14) conditions. 
Insert Tables 6 here 
Overall, this set of results suggest that the readability of CEO pay ratio disclosure can 
influence investor judgments. In particular, we find that the effects of CEO pay ratio disclosure is 
diminished when readability is lower (as is the case in the supplementary condition) than when it 
is higher (as is the case in the main experiment). This suggests that managers may indeed benefit 
by obfuscating bad news by manipulating the readability of financial disclosure (consistent with 
Li’s (2008) claim). 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines how trust arising from a firm’s corporate reputation will interact with 
executive compensation disclosure to influence investor judgments. Regulators have increased the 
disclosure requirements of top executives as part of corporate governance reform. Top executive 
compensation has been an area of contention in recent years and could potentially undermine trust 
more easily than other forms of disclosure.  
The findings show that investor judgements of a firm were more positive when the firm 
has a good corporate reputation than when it has a bad corporate reputation. Participants also react 
more positively to the disclosure of low than high pay ratio. The findings also show that if a firm 
with a good corporate reputation discloses a high pay ratio, there is negative violation of 
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expectations and the good reputation firm would be punished more than a bad reputation firm. On 
the other hand, if a firm with a bad corporate reputation discloses a low pay ratio, there is a positive 
violation of expectations and the bad reputation firm would be rewarded more than a good 
reputation firm. Overall, the results suggest that trust plays an important role for the effect of 
compensation disclosure on investor judgments. It is important for companies not to violate the 
trust build up by their corporate reputation. 
The results of the supplementary experiment show that the effects of pay ratio disclosure 
is diminished when readability is lower (as is the case in the supplementary condition) than when 
it is higher (as is the case in the main experiment). This suggests that managers may indeed benefit 
by obfuscating bad news by manipulating the readability of compensation disclosure. 
There are limitations for this study. A limitation relates to external validity associated with 
the experimental method adopted for this study. The results of this study may be limited by its 
particular circumstances of corporate reputation and compensation disclosure, making 
generalizations of the findings to other settings difficult. Future research could examine other 
settings and consider other target audiences, besides investors for this study. 
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Table 1: 
Participants’ initial investment judgments of Great Meansa 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
         Corporate Reputation 
Pay Ratio Good Bad 
High 5.27 (1.52) 
[56] 
0.00 (4.74) 
[65] 
Low 4.65 (2.04) 
[74] 
-0.98 (4.65) 
[49] 
 
Panel B: Conventional ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value  
Intercept 1189.17 1 1189.17 48.71 0.00 
Corporate Reputation 1767.70 1 1767.70 146.05 0.00 
Pay Ratio 38.06 1 38.06 3.14 0.08 
Corporate 
Reputation*Pay 
Ratio 
1.93 1 1.93 0.16 0.69 
Error 2904.83 240 12.10   
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Panel C: Follow Up Simple Effects Tests 
Simple Effects Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value (two- 
tailed) 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is high 
834.80 1 834.80 63.48 0.00 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is low 
933.83 1 933.83 84.33 0.00 
a Table 1 presents statistical results related to participants’ initial investment judgments of Great Meals (pre_investment). Panel 
A presents descriptive statistics for pre_investment, panel B presents the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and 
panel C presents follow-up simple main effects tests. 
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Table 2: 
Participants’ final investment judgments of Great Meansa 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
         Corporate Reputation 
Pay Ratio Good Bad 
High 3.46 (2.66) 
[56] 
-0.60 (2.28) 
[65] 
Low 4.05 (2.24) 
[74] 
-0.80 (4.19) 
[49] 
 
Panel B: Conventional ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value  
Intercept 588.10 1 588.10 44.04 0.00 
Corporate Reputation 1183.14 1 1183.14 93.37 0.00 
Pay Ratio 2.31 1 2.31 0.18 0.67 
Corporate 
Reputation*Pay 
Ratio 
9.19 1 9.19 0.73 0.40 
Error 3041.27 240 12.67   
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Panel C: Follow Up Simple Effects Tests 
Simple Effects Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value (two- 
tailed) 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is high 
496.92 1 496.92 32.18 0.00 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is low 
693.43 1 693.43 69.70 0.00 
a Table 2 presents statistical results related to participants’ final investment judgments of Great Meals (post_investment). Panel 
A presents descriptive statistics for post_investment, panel B presents the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and 
panel C presents follow-up simple main effects tests. 
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Table 3: 
Participants’ change in investment judgments of Great Meansa 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
         Corporate Reputation 
Pay Ratio Good Bad 
High -1.80 (2.61) 
[56] 
-0.60 (2.28) 
[65] 
Low -0.59 (1.48) 
[74] 
0.18 (1.36) 
[49] 
 
Panel B: Conventional ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value  
Intercept 117.94 3 35.96 9.03 0.00 
Corporate Reputation 58.48 1 117.94 29.62 0.00 
Pay Ratio 59.12 1 59.12 14.85 0.00 
Corporate 
Reputation*Pay 
Ratio 
2.69 1 2.69 0.68 0.41 
Error 955.62 240 3.98   
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Panel C: Follow Up Simple Effects Tests 
Simple Effects Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value (two- 
tailed) 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is high 
43.58 1 43.58 7.34 0.01 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is low 
17.86 1 17.86 8.67 0.00 
a Table 3 presents statistical results related to participants’ change in investment judgments of Great Meals (change_investment). 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for change_investment, panel B presents the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
and panel C presents follow-up simple main effects tests. 
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Table 4: 
Participants’ initial investment judgments of Great Meansa 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
         Corporate Reputation 
Pay Ratio Good Bad 
High 4.75 (1.82) 
[51] 
0.91 (4.95) 
[70] 
Low 4.95 (2.05) 
[63] 
0.05 (4.80) 
[56] 
 
Panel B: Conventional ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value  
Intercept 1682.09 1 1682.09 117.28 0.00 
Corporate Reputation 1126.92 1 1126.92 78.57 0.00 
Pay Ratio 6.31 1 6.31 0.44 0.51 
Corporate 
Reputation*Pay 
Ratio 
16.87 1 16.87 1.18 0.28 
Error 3384.87 236 14.34   
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Panel C: Follow Up Simple Effects Tests 
Simple Effects Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value (two- 
tailed) 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is high 
432.98 1 432.98 27.71 0.00 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is low 
711.48 1 711.48 54.56 0.00 
a Table 4 presents statistical results related to participants’ initial investment judgments of Great Meals (pre_investment) in the 
supplementary experiment where the readability of CEO pay ratio disclosure is low. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for 
pre_investment, panel B presents the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and panel C presents follow-up simple main 
effects tests. 
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Table 5: 
Participants’ final investment judgments of Great Meansa 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
         Corporate Reputation 
Pay Ratio Good Bad 
High 3.45 (2.72) 
[51] 
0.67 (4.82) 
[70] 
Low 4.13 (2.39) 
[63] 
0.30 (4.42) 
[56] 
 
Panel B: Conventional ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value  
Intercept 1081.77 1 1081.77 75.02 0.00 
Corporate Reputation 644.73 1 644.73 44.71 0.00 
Pay Ratio 1.40 1 1.40 0.10 0.76 
Corporate 
Reputation*Pay 
Ratio 
16.11 1 16.11 1.12 0.29 
Error 3402.89 236 14.42   
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Panel C: Follow Up Simple Effects Tests 
Simple Effects Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value (two- 
tailed) 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is high 
227.95 1 227.95 13.73 0.00 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is low 
433.40 1 433.40 35.54 0.00 
a Table 5 presents statistical results related to participants’ final investment judgments of Great Meals (post_investment) in the 
supplementary experiment where the readability of CEO pay ratio disclosure is low. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for 
post_investment, panel B presents the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and panel C presents follow-up simple 
main effects tests. 
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Table 6: 
Participants’ change in investment judgments of Great Meansa 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
         Corporate Reputation 
Pay Ratio Good Bad 
High -1.29 (1.97) 
[51] 
-0.24 (1.65) 
[70] 
Low -0.83 (1.61) 
[63] 
0.25 (2.11) 
[56] 
 
Panel B: Conventional ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value  
Intercept 65.98 1 65.98 19.79 0.00 
Corporate Reputation 66.88 1 66.88 20.05 0.00 
Pay Ratio 13.67 1 13.67 4.10 0.04 
Corporate 
Reputation*Pay 
Ratio 
0.01 1 0.01 0.00 0.96 
Error 787.04 236 3.34   
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Panel C: Follow Up Simple Effects Tests 
Simple Effects Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value (two- 
tailed) 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is high 
32.61 1 32.61 10.17 0.00 
Effect of good 
versus bad corporate 
reputation when pay 
ratio is low 
34.29 1 34.29 9.89 0.00 
a Table 6 presents statistical results related to participants’ change in investment judgments of Great Meals (change_investment) in 
the supplementary experiment where the readability of CEO pay ratio disclosure is low. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for 
change_investment, panel B presents the conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA), and panel C presents follow-up simple main 
effects tests. 
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